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TONER ON JUDGMENT AND ETERNALISM
Alexander R. Pruss

Patrick Toner has argued that eternalism, the doctrine that all times are onto
logically on par, conflicts with the Catholic view of judgment as based on the
state of the soul at death. For, he holds, it is arbitrary that judgment should
be based on what happened at some particular time, unless, as presentism
holds, that time is the only that really exists. I shall argue that his argument
fails because the eternalist can say that judgment is simultaneous with the
state of soul that is being judged, and there is nothing arbitrary about judging
something at t on the basis of its state at the same time t.

1. Introduction

In a provocative recent paper,1 Patrick Toner has argued that eternalism,
the doctrine that all times are ontologically on par, conflicts with the doc
trine of judgment as understood by Catholics, whereas presentism, the
doctrine that only present things and events are real, leads to no such
difficulty. In his argument, Toner distinguishes perdurantism on which
substances like human persons have temporal parts and are four-dimen
sional worms, from endurantism on which a substance is fully present
at whatever time it exists in.2 Toner's argument is initially formulated
against perdurantist eternalism, and then proceeds to be an argument
against endurantist eternalism. I shall in the end argue that the argument
fails because Toner fails to consider a plausible account of judgment, the
simultaneous punishment account, an account that his own argument ap
pears to commit him to. But I shall first consider another objection.
2. The State o f Soul A ssum ption

Toner assumes that God judges people not for what they have done, but
for their state of soul at the time of judgment. Call this the "state of soul
assumption." The doctrinal basis for this assumption seems to be that, in
Catholic doctrine, one is damned if and only if one dies in a state of mortal
sin. However, the state of soul assumption does not follow from the claim
that judgment is based on whether one dies in mortal sin. For here is a
model compatible with the claim that God judges us based on whether we
die in mortal sin but not compatible with the "state of soul assumption":
God judges people for what they have done and not been forgiven for,
and damns a person to hell if and only if there is a mortal sin among the
unforgiven sins.
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Now, someone is in a state of mortal sin if and only if she has culpably
done a mortal sin and not been forgiven for it. This might be taken as an
analysis of what it is to be in a state of mortal sin, in which case it turns out
that the being in a state of mortal sin is not a state of soul, but a historical
property, and the argument for the state of soul assumption is blocked.
Alternately, one might simply say that in God's plan of salvation, there
is a perfect correlation between having one's soul in a state of mortal sin
and having culpably done an unforgiven mortal sin. If this is true, then a
person goes to hell if and only if she dies in a particular state of soul, but
she does not go to hell because of that state of soul. Instead, she goes to hell
because of the correlate of that state of soul, namely the historical fact of
having culpably done an unforgiven mortal sin. On such accounts, God
judges people on the basis of historical facts, and the argument for the state
of soul assumption is blocked. Moreover, if this is correct, then presentism
becomes less plausible than eternalism, because if presentism holds, then
on this view God judges people for non-existent (because past) sins.
3. Sim ultaneous P unishm ent

Toner rejects such historical views of the basis of judgment in favor of the
state of soul assumption. Nonetheless, even so his argument fails. To see
that it does, consider the following account of divine punishment. After a
person dies, God punishes a person at t because the person at t has a soul
in a state of mortal sin. I will call this the "simultaneous punishment"
account, in that the punishment is simultaneous with that for which the
person is being punished.
Now Toner's main argument against eternalism is that "the fact that
God just picks one moment of [the judged person's] life as his standard
of judgment seems disturbingly arbitrary" (p. 321). There were infinitely
many other moments to pick from, and the person may well have done
things of a radically different sort at them.
But on the simultaneous punishment account, arbitrariness disappears.
For there is nothing arbitrary about punishing someone at t for her state
at t. In fact, this is exactly what we would expect if perdurantism were to
hold: each temporal stage is punished precisely for that temporal stage's
moral shortfall. But even if endurantism holds, there is no objectionable
arbitrariness. The fact that all persons are ontologically on par does not
prohibit me from treating a person differently on account of her relation
to me, say because she is my wife, as long as that relation is a morally rel
evant one. The relation between the person treated and the person treating
is clearly important for many ethical questions. Likewise, that all times
are ontologically on par does not prohibit one from differentially treating
events at different times depending on the relation that these times have
to the time of treatment, as long as that relation is morally significant. And
identity does seem to be morally significant—it makes sense to treat at t
events at a time t1 differently when in fact t1 is identical with t . There need
be nothing objectionably arbitrary about complaining at t about the pain
one has at t even though one does not in the same way complain at t about
pains at other times, just as there need be nothing objectionably arbitrary
about x 's complaining about the pain that x has in a way different from x 's
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complaint about the pains of other persons (there may be other reasons to
criticize someone who does not care about the pains of others on par with
her own).
I do not know whether the simultaneous punishment account is cor
rect. But I think Toner is committed to it. For it would clearly be problem
atic on Toner's grounds for a person at t1 to be punished for the state of
soul she had at an earlier time t 0. After all, given presentism, the past is
unreal, and punishing someone for unreal states of soul is surely unjust.
Moreover, the same arbitrariness objection that is raised by Toner against
the eternalist could be raised here against the presentist if the simultane
ous punishment thesis were denied.
On the simultaneous punishment account, then, there is nothing arbi
trary for a person at a given time to be punished for her state of soul at the
same time. This is particularly clear given perdurantism, but is also a de
fensible claim given endurantism. If this is correct, then Toner's argument
fails because there is a model that makes Catholic eschatology cohere with
eternalism, and it is a model that he himself seems to be committed to.
4. Judgm ent

However, one may object that Toner is talking of a doctrine of ju d g m en t ,
not of punishment. And judgment is once and for all. Judgment happens
at some specific time t0, and the punishment is done later, not on account
of the state of soul at that later time, but on account of the judgment's hav
ing been passed. Now, while it would not be arbitrary to punish someone
at t 0 for her state at t0, it might be argued that given eternalism it is arbi
trary to sen ten ce someone at t0 for her whole future based merely on her
state at t 0.
Several responses are possible. The first is to say that in fact judgment
by God can be taken as simultaneous with punishment. It is also Catholic
teaching, for instance, that the souls of the damned are punished right af
ter death and even before the universal "Last Judgment," in virtue of their
"particular judgment." There would be nothing absurd about supposing
this particular judgment to be simultaneous with the punishment, and to
continue while the punishment continues, i.e., forever. The Last Judgment,
then, is the time of a public judgment, where the things hidden are made
manifest, and where all receive their bodies, ultimately for a life of beati
tude or a life of suffering. The Last Judgment is then a public judgment
made in virtue of the state of soul at that time, but the proximate cause of
the person's punishment at any given time after the Last Judgment might
be seen as a judgment simultaneous with the punishment.
Furthermore, the simultaneous punishment account allowed one to say
that w hat one is punished at t for is one's state of soul soul at t, a view to
which a presentist should be attracted, or maybe even one to which a presentist is committed. But one can only be punished for something when
one has been judged for it (this is a conceptual truth about "punishment"),
and since it seems inappropriate to judge people for their future states,
it follows that there must be judgment simultaneous with the on-going
punishment. Hence the simultaneous punishment account implies a si
multaneous judgment account.
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Finally one might note that even if we reject the simultaneous judg
ment account, the eternalist is not in any worse shape than the presentist.
It may seem unfair to sentence at t someone to hell for her entire future
in virtue of her state at t. But the apparent unfairness of this seems little
different from the apparent unfairness of someone now and for the rest of
her future being in hell in virtue of her having been judged once based on
what she was like then . The presentist and the perdurantist eternalist have
the worst of it here. Given presentism, someone suffers for a state that is
not really her state and due to a non-existent past judgment, while the
perdurantist eternalist has one temporal slice suffer for the misdeeds of
another, misdeeds of which that other was judged guilty. The endurantist
eternalist is a bit better off here, in that she holds that the person suffers
for her ow n real misdeeds, but has to explain why it was appropriate for an
eternal judgment to be made based on a state at a particular time.
I should note that the simultaneous judgment account is quite com
patible with a view on which further repentance is not possible after one
dies, say because God allows one to make one's soul to "snap" into a
permanent shape.
5. Chronos O uketi Estai

Let me end by considering one objection. I have assumed that the suffer
ing of hell and the joy of heaven are temporal states. Toner's talking of
judgment being based on "the last temporal part" (p. 319) suggests that
he may believe that being in hell or heaven are timeless states, so that we
somehow get taken up into God's timelessness. I am aware that a number
of Christians believe this, perhaps on the basis of Rev. 10:6 which ends:
"chronos ouketi estai " ("there will be no more chronos "). However, the Re
vised Standard Version translates this as "there should be no more delay,"
and the New International Version, New American Bible and New Re
vised Standard Version all concur in translating chronos as "delay."
Translating chronos as either "delay" or "time" can be made to fit with
the context: the "delay" reading implies the hastening of events at the time
of the seventh trumpet call (Rev. 10:7), while the assertion of atemporality
would fit with verse 7's talk of the "mystery of God" (m usterion tou theou ),
though actually I suspect that the "mystery" is not of the Godhead but
of what God has done for us, hence the reference to the prophets in that
verse. However, the "delay" reading avoids the apparent self-contradic
tion of saying that "there w ill be no more time," which would seem to
imply a tem poral relation between a state outside time and a state in time.
And would we really want to say of ourselves once we are in the afterlife
that now we are timeless but we w ere in time? The problem is intuitively
exacerbated for the presentist.
Perhaps, though, the timelessness of the afterlife would consist in the
last moment of existence being somehow "frozen" into eternity. But it is
not clear what sense could be made of such "freezing" without commit
ting oneself to some version of the "river of time" subject to the classic
criticisms of Donald Williams.3
Furthermore, a view of the afterlife as essentially timeless seems to
make the idea of the resurrection of the body largely pointless, since all the
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functions of a body as such seem to be temporal in nature. Moreover, even
a reading of Rev. 10:6 as saying that "time will be no more" can be under
stood non-literally (and who doubts that the Book of Revelation should
be understood non-literally at least in part?), as meaning that salvation
history will be completed, with the succession of significant cataclysmic
events—creation, flood, choice of Abraham, exodus, exile, return, incarna
tion, crucifixion, resurrection, sending of the Holy Spirit, and Last Judg
ment—coming to a close.
That said, even if one sees heaven and hell as timeless states, my argu
ments seem to work. Judgment and punishment or reward can likewise
be timeless states, "co-eternal" with the state of soul on whose basis they
are made. It may be a problem if one thinks that judgment is in time, and
"then" comes the timeless punishment or reward, but it is not at all clear
that this is a bigger problem for the eternalist than for the presentist. For
in the timeless state of being punished, the person is then punished for the
state she "had" in time. It does not seem that the presentist can allow that
last temporal state to continue to be real from the point of view of a per
son "now" outside of time (the quotation marks I am occasionally using
underscore the metaphysical difficulties of this view). After all, according
to the presentist, the only time that exists is the present. The person is not
in time, and hence it seems that no time is present to her, and hence no time
exists to her.4
Baylor University
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